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Abstract
The European Unions’s task of providing Trans-European Networks (TENs) in transportation, communications
and energy transmission which has been enacted by the treaty of Maastricht, is not confined to internal networks
in the EU. Since 1994 this task has been widened so as to give support to the economies in transition (EIT) in
Central and Eastern Europe that have applied for EU membership.
These actions are taking place in a variety of different fields. Transport infrastructure upgrading is initiated both
in general and with respect to specific links between the EU and the EIT. The international community is
supporting network upgrading in all Baltic Rim EIT. Specific infrastructure measures refer to the Pan-European
„Crete Corridors“, i.e. the links between EU members and associated EIT. Other „hardware“ measures are
related to the construction of border stations or the promotion of telematics in the whole Baltic Sea Region in
order to facilitate freight traffic. On the „software“ side, TEN initiatives have been enacted to harmonize
infrastructure cross-border planning, in particular for Crete Corridors’ supervising committees, to account for
network externalities. If one widens the narrow definition of infrastructure to institutions, the adjustment of EITs’
transport regulatory systems to EU regulations and competition policy can also be subsumed under the heading
of TENs.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the relative importance of the various measures taken in the course of the
TEN initiative in the field of transport for economic development of the EIT on the Eastern shore of the Baltic
Sea. The paper considers these actual approaches of European transport policy as well as the needs of the EIT.
Though missing infrastructure links and insufficient capacities are more visible, it turns out that „software“
problems (both from the sphere of regulatory regimes and from administrative procedures) seem to be the most
pressing obstacles to transport and trade in the Baltic Rim. The paper discusses the pros and cons of the various
TEN components in transport from the perspective of fiscal federalism and of regional development aid for the
EIT. Furthermore it refers to issues of modal split, in particular with respect to Russia (for which the Baltic Rim
is an important transit point), and to intermodal competition between land transport and the Baltic sea lane.1
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1. Trans-European Networks in the Eastern Baltic Sea Region in a Pan-
European Perspective
The Baltic Sea Region was, and still is, subject to far-reaching processes of both
disintegration and integration. In the Eastern part of this region, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
have gained political independence, and together with Poland, they have disintegrated from
the former Soviet type division of labour and the former CMEA trade relations. From the
Western side the Baltic Sea is going to become a kind of inland sea of the European Union
(EU). Now, with the exception of Russia, the Economies in Transition (EIT) on the Eastern
Baltic Rim have applied for full EU membership, and Estonia and Poland have been invited to
participate in the first negotiation round for a future Eastern enlargement of the EU. Sooner or
later, the Baltic Rim applicants will be integrated integration into the EU markets, and become
subject to the full application of the acquis communautaire and the actual EU policy
approaches.
This refers not the least to the transport sector, which provides the base for the physical
accomplishment of market integration, and to the pertinent actual Union policy approaches for
this sector: (a) the application of common rules for the transport markets’ framework, and (b)
the provision of Trans-European Networks (TENs) in infrastructure policy. The first approach
refers to the mutually opening up of transport markets and application of EU safety, technical
and competition rules in the course of the „Agenda 2000“ accession preparations (see Boeing
1998). Concerning infrastructure policy, it is since 1992 that the EU quasi-federal layer has
been granted with substantial new competencies of planning and co-financing TENs,
providing access to them and harmonizing pertinent technical parameters.
2 This task has been
specified by the White Paper on „Growth, Competitiveness, and Employment“ of 1993
(Commission 1993). According to the White Paper, the emergence of TENs forms a
substantial tool for enhancing both Europe’s growth potential and economic cohesion. It may
be sees as a sequel to the opening up of European markets by the Single Market Program of
1985 in order to avoid severe capacity bottlenecks in the Union’s infrastructure networks
(Vickerman 1995).
Based on considerations both on preparing the applicants in the east for future membership
and on the actual needs of the EIT in the east, the task of taking action in TEN infrastructure
policy has been widened from intra-EU to external networks including those of all the EIT. To
be precise: This is perceived as a Pan-European task which is not confined to the EU. It was
on the Second Pan-European Conference of Ministers of Transport 1994 in Crete where the2
so-called „Crete-Corridors“, i.e. the links between EU members and associated EIT were
defined. Priority action of all actors who are involved in upgrading existing and in
augmenting new infrastructure capacities in Central and Eastern European reform countries
will be concentrated along these corridors. But notwithstanding their Pan-European character,
the Crete Corridors serve as a guiding scheme for EU accession support to associated EIT in
transport infrastructure (re-) construction, and may thus be thought upon as a genuine
instrument from the tool-box of the European Union’s TEN policy.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the relative importance of the various measures taken
by the international community in the field of transport for economic development of the EIT.
Geographically, the paper will confine itself to the situation in the associated EIT on the
Eastern shore of the Baltic Sea (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) with some reference
given also to the Russian Baltic Rim oblasts of Kaliningrad and Leningrad because of close
complementarities in geographical situation and in transport relations. The confined focus
may be justified by the fact that the Baltic Sea region provides an interesting and encouraging
example both of multi-modal competition and of a natural infrastructure facility being
provided free of charge: the Baltic Sea itself which — even in the past of the Iron Curtain —
has linked the adjacent countries rather than separating them.
The paper will consider the actual approaches of European transport policy (section 2) as well
as the needs of the EIT (section 3). Though missing infrastructure links and insufficient
capacities are more visible, it turns out that „software“ problems (both from the sphere of
regulatory regimes and from administrative procedures) seem to be the most pressing
obstacles to transport and trade in the Baltic Rim. The paper will discuss the pros and cons of
the various TEN components in transport from the perspective (a) of regional development aid
for the EIT and of (b) fiscal federalism consideration. (c) Furthermore it will refer to issues of
modal split, in particular with respect to Russia (for which the Baltic Rim is an important
transit point), and to intermodal competition between land transport and the Baltic sea lane
(section 4).
2. European Transport Policy Actions Pursued in Eastern Europe
Transport infrastructure and market related actions in Eastern Europe are taking place in a
variety of different fields. It is on the hardware side of infrastructure provision where the
international community provides substantial support. Transport infrastructure upgrading is
initiated both in general and with respect to the specific links between the EU and the EIT.
Apparently the Baltic Rim EIT — as all former CMEA members — suffered and still suffer
from the legacy of the socialist past with respect to network design, capacity and quality
standards. This has been acknowledged both by the Baltic Rim EIT and by the international
community which is supporting network upgrading in all Baltic Rim EIT.3
Following a Commission’s proposal, the transport ministers of the EU and their colleagues
from the CEEC applicants jointly launched the so-called TINA initiative (Transport
Infrastructure Needs Assessment) in September 1995. TINA aims at identifying necessary
network infrastructure developments for a future larger Union and its findings will gain the
character of a master-plan for infrastructure hardware provision in the applicant countries like
the Essen summit guidelines of 1994 for EU internal TENs (Kinnock 1998).
There is a division of labour with regard to modes and countries between the European Union
itself, employing funds from the PHARE and TACIS program with additional budget lines
planned for the near future, EU’s subsidiary EIB and the other supra-national institutions, like
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank. Support is
given both to all Baltic Rim applicants and to Russia, encompassing projects of airport (re-)
construction, railway infrastructure upgrading and operational improvements, and road
building and improving bridges, tunnels and other complementary facilities.
The core support refers to financial aid, as it has become clear that the public budgets of the
applicant countries cannot bear the costs of network upgrading and completion on their own
account so that substantial external financial support was envisaged. The European
Commission currently estimates the financial needs for improving the situation alongside the
Crete Corridors to 50 Billion ECU and for the rest of the applicant countries’ networks to 100
Billion ECU up to 2010.
3
Of course, specific infrastructure measures refer to the „Crete Corridors“ which are officially
endorsed as main traffic axes with trans-national significance. By financing projects alongside
the Crete corridors, the EU and the other institutions of the international community are
engaging themselves also in issues of rail and road network planning. When nationally
planned projects have to be accepted for financing on EU or supra-national level this means at
least a certain involvement of the EU layer in planning tasks, which is added to national
planning.
4
Other „hardware“ measures are related to support to the construction of (i) border stations to
allow for rapid operational co-operation of railways and (ii) of customs clearance stations on
existing or newly erected borderlines. In addition, the EU is promoting the development of
telematics system in the whole Baltic Sea Region in order to facilitate freight traffic.
On the „software“ side, TEN initiatives have been enacted to harmonize infrastructure cross-
border planning, in particular for Crete Corridors’ supervising committees, to account for
network externalities and trans-border effects of networks. The adjustment of EITs’ transport
regulatory systems to EU regulations and competition policy in the course of the „Agenda
2000“ pre-accession support may also be subsumed under the heading of TENs. This refers to
the full adaptation of EU safety and technical norms for the various modes, the4
implementation of EU competition and subsidy control standards, and a progressive mutually
opening up of market access to transport markets (Boeing 1998).
3. The Empirical Side: Basic Transport Needs in the Eastern Baltic Sea
Region
The situation in the CEEC as regards transport infrastructure, transport regulation and the
daily operation of the transport system in all its facets has completely changed since the
political upturn of the early 1990s and the ongoing transformation process from a centrally
planned to a more or less market oriented economic system. The transport sector is as affected
by the transformation as any other sector of the EIT. Thus, the question arises where the most
pressing obstacles to a sound development of the transport sector in these countries can be
found. Basically, three categories of potential obstacles can be discerned:
(1)   obstacles caused by capacity bottlenecks in infrastructure facilities, like ports, railway
networks, roads, air-ports and complementary equipment (let us call them „hardware
obstacles“);
(2)   obstacles caused by deficiencies in the institutional framework of legal factors both on the
international and on the national layer, like the enrollment to international treaties or
national market regulations (because of their basic character they may be called „macro-
software obstacles“); and
(3)   a variety of obstacles associated with the daily operation of facilities, with administrative
issues, with productivity of transport firms, with the transformation process itself or
coming from outside the transport sector (because they impair the smooth working of the
transport system at the individual level or indirectly, like grains of sand in a gearing, let us
call them „micro-software obstacles“).
3.1. Infrastructure Facility Upgrading and Network Design
To be sure: It cannot be doubted that transport infrastructure in the Baltic Rim EIT suffered
and still suffers from severe shortcomings, low quality and various bottlenecks. However,
some reservations have to be made with respect (a) to the various modes and (b) to the relative
relevance of hardware and software obstacles.
There are basically different developments in the maritime sector and concerning land-based
infrastructures. In the maritime sector, port capacities were already provided in Soviet times
to an extent which may be regarded to be sufficient for the current turnover of cargo and even
for the turnover of the foreseeable future. This assessment holds true for traffic volumes
which have more than recovered from the sharp decline shortly after the political changes in
the early 1990 for most of the Eastern Baltic ports with the exception of Klaipeda/Lithuania
(Table 1); taken together cargo turnover has passed the benchmark of 1988: 135 m. tonnes by5
more than 5 m. tonnes in 1996 with an upward going tendency for subsequent years (Böhme
et al. 1998a: 37 ff.). The ports in the three Baltic countries Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had
been constructed and upgraded during the Soviet era to the very end of serving as major
transit points for Russian foreign trade because of their favourable geographic location and
climatic (relatively ice-free) conditions.
5 Thus, the hardware capacities in ports did not and do
not make up serious bottlenecks after the recovery of trade flows. In addition, since the early
1990s, port facilities in the Baltic countries and in Poland even have been adapted rather
rapidly to the structural changes towards modern forms of sea transport, like container and
roll-on-roll-off traffic, which is playing a more and more important role in the general cargo
segment of shippings. Where pertinent equipment like container cranes, pontoons at the
cayside, or special ramps was lacking in the first place, it could be provided at comparatively
short notice (ibid.: 80). The same holds true for the terminal capacities which serve the rapidly
growing passenger ferry traffic (ibid.: 43 ff.).
Of course, serious infrastructure related problems still are encountered by transport enterprises
in the Eastern Baltic ports. But these belong to the software categories of obstacles, mostly
„micro software“ obstacles of port operations, like low productivity of still not privatized port
operators, poor intermodal co-operations or administrative and customs clearance problems.
In contrast, land-based infrastructure networks in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and in
particular the Russian Baltic oblasts still suffer much more from the legacy of the past than
maritime infrastructure. Road, rail and air traffic infrastructure facilities were and are still
underdeveloped as regards network composition. To be sure: not the density measures (per
area or population figures) make up for the problem (Tables 2 and 3), but the qualitative
aspects of networks. Facility maintenance has been largely neglected in Soviet/CMEA times,
and investment in network upgrades and augmentations has been below the level which is
necessary to provide uncongested high capacity networks in regional markets with an
intensive division of labour. Deficiencies exist with regard to a lack of high-performance
corridors for rail and road, but also to lacking by-passes of congested agglomerations or even
of simple villages. Moreover, tracks, roadbeds, and bridges are in large parts worn-out, or do
not comply with quality standards which are necessary for easy accessibility and safe
transport (e.g. concerning safe axle loads for rail tracks, roads, and runways, or the capacity of
air traffic management devices). Thus, concrete physical infrastructure bottlenecks are still
hampering land and air transport in the Baltic Rim EIT much more than in the maritime sector
(ibid.: 87 ff.).
In addition, in the past both public planning processes for designing infrastructure networks
and maintenance administrations for the capacities installed were lacking professionality.
Hence, training is financed by international support programs. Thus, also in land-based6
infrastructure the software-aspects which are directly complementary to the very network
facilities, call for high attention.
3.2. Formation of Transport Markets in the Baltic Sea EIT
Macro-software obstacles to transport and trade in the Eastern Baltic Region resulting from
lacking adherence to international regulatory agreements or missing national regulations seem
to have vanished in rather short term and do no longer play a prominent role in this region.
International agreements and conventions — such as the International Convention on the Law
of the Sea, bilateral shipping treaties in maritime transport, the Geneva Convention on the
International Goods Transport Treaty, the Convention on International Civil Aviation — have
been signed by the Baltic countries and Poland. In addition, these countries have joined the
pertinent organizations  — like the International Civil Aviation Organization. This allows
them to negotiate bilateral agreement of market access. Also in shipping, and in road transport
bilateral traffic right have been negotiated. Hence, macro software obstacles in the pertinent
transport relations have lost relevance as far as the international layer is concerned, with some
exceptions for Russia, e.g. in air traffic (ibid.: 65 ff.). This is not to say that market access has
been opened completely to foreign operators for all modes. E.g. in road transport bilateral
agreements grant only partial market access to foreigners, subject to quantitative restrictions
of quotas for single border-crossing trips. This may constitute a constraining barrier to entry,
as has proven in the case of Baltic countries’ hauliers, who began to penetrate Russian road
transport markets and were banned not only by limited quotas but also by additional obstacles
form the sphere of customs regulations (ibid.: 68 f., 114 f.).
The process of privatization of former state-owned transport firms is going on for the various
modes, however with different speed in the several Baltic Rim EIT. As is the case with
privatization in general, Estonia has taken the overall lead and has extended its far-reaching
privatization plans (with foreign capital being invited to participate) to all kind of transport
firms since 1993 and to infrastructure management like port operations. The country is even
trying to find a foreign private operator for the presumably remunerative part of its rail
operations, the east-west line from the Russian border to the port of Tallinn. Latvia took the
lead in airline privatization inviting foreign stock-holders in 1995, followed by Estonia one
year later (ibid.: 69 ff.). In contrast, privatization in Lithuania and in Poland is not pursued
with the same intensity as in the other two countries, e.g. in air traffic. The main opposition is
raised against potential future reorganizations which would raise productivity and which
would be the main economic rational for privatizing. The picture in Russia is quite more
puzzling, e.g. with a co-existence of newly founded private firms, partly privatized firms,
publicly owned joint-stock companies and even some combines which have survived in road
transport, or with a similar phenomenon in air-transport where the all-embracing integration7
of former Aeroflot had to be dissolved, but where several „production associations“ between
airports and airlines still have survived.
As far as domestic market access and price or quality regulations are concerned, regulatory
structures seem to emerge in the EIT which may be qualified as rather liberal compared with
former Western models of tightly regulated transport markets; licensing for road transport and
for air transport exists albeit without license quotas. These open access frameworks seem
appropriate for the newly emerging transport markets in the EIT, and are required for
adjustment to EU market regimes anyway (ibid.: 77 ff.).
In sum, considerable progress has been made with respect to creating and implementing of
„macro-software“.
3.3. Daily Operations of Transport Infrastructures and Transport Firms
It has already been mentioned that micro-software aspects which are directly connected to
planning new and operating and maintaining the existing infrastructure facilities of all modes
cause larger problems in transport in the Eastern Baltic Region than the lack of facilities itself.
This empirical result can be generalized. Concerning micro-software obstacles within
transport business, impeding and costly factors stem from (i) an inefficient use of the
hardware available in the sea-ports and within the rail networks due to lacking professionality,
postponed privatization of privately operational functions, and lacking commercial attitudes,
(ii) shortages in managerial and technical human-capital as well as operational and
professional skills of employees in transport firms, most prominently in the national railway
enterprises, (iii) missing inter-modal co-operation where transit chains are concerned and
economies of scope would render such co-operation as a cost-saving solution, e.g. in port
hinterland traffic, (iv) an inadequate institutional design at the lower administrative level,
where state authorities necessarily are involved, which often takes the form of discriminatory
behaviour of administrations, e.g. with respect to pricing of port dues, railway rates, and
airport landing fees (Böhme et al. 1998: 100 ff.).
These examples suggest the conclusion that shortages and shortcomings do not reflect
structural problems of the Eastern Baltic Sea transport markets, but are more or less result of
the current state of the reform process in the EIT and of still prevalent learning-by-doing
deficiencies. Thus, these obstacles should be temporary. Removing them could be furthered, if
the process of institutional reforms would gather more momentum.
3.4 Complementary Customs and Safety Issues
It may be surprising, but the most pressing obstacles to transport in the Eastern Baltic Sea
Region stem from micro-software obstacles which are rooted outside the transport sector8
itself, namely from irregular and time-consuming customs procedures and from still
constraining safety problems.
Complex and time-consuming customs procedures are encountered by transport firms: (i)
Procedural obstacles stem from the mere existence of customs controls due to the fact that the
countries in question are not part of the same free-trade area. Although Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania and Poland have negotiated association agreements („Europe-agreements“) with the
EU granting free trade to the bulk of trade flows, and although the three Baltic countries have
agreed upon a common free trade area, trade flows in this area are far from being liberalized.
But the most pertinent cases are Russian and CIS im- and exports which have to pass a border
with rather high tariff- and non-tariff-barriers. (ii) Transport firms are confronted with a costly
instability of rule-making and rapid and often unexpected alterations of customs regulations.
In this respect severe commitment problems arise and decisions are often governed by daily
political or often changing protective reasons. (iii) Likewise, the application of these rules by
the customs administrations varies substantially between different locations or in time, even if
rules have not been changed at all. (iv) Customs administrations often are said to lack
flexibility. (v) In addition, hardware obstacles arise with shortages of border clearing facilities
and of corresponding well-trained administrative staff.
The costs of these customs procedures materialize in long delays of trucks or of trains at
border stations, which, for the time being, eliminate or even overcompensate all gains from
upgrading infrastructure networks and time-saving technical progress in transport. Moreover,
additional human capital costs for adhering to the complex procedures have to be incurred. In
addition, transport costs are raised directly in those cases where by-pass strategies concerning
transport routes or modal shifts are followed. In the Kiel Institute study, the authors have not
attempted to translate these categories in concrete money terms, but according to reports of
shippers and hauliers transport costs in the relations with Russia and the CIS (both via Baltic
ports and via the land-based networks through Poland) are raised by customs procedure much
more than by missing infrastructure links.
Additional costs have to be incurred because of higher safety risks than in other transport
relations. Criminal offences— in the form of theft of cargo, containers or even entire transport
vehicles — are reported for all modes, but in particular for road transport. In most cases,
complaints are directed to the situation in Russia, but because of the high share of transit trade
to and from Russia and the in the Baltic republics and to a lesser extent also in Poland this
obstacle relates to a high share of transport relations in this whole area. Additional costs have
to be incurred by employing extra devices for trip control and planning trip to the tiniest
details.
Summing up: Despite all troublesome hardware legacies from the Soviet/CMEA era there is
no transport crisis in the Eastern Baltic Sea Region with respect to infrastructure facilities.9
The most relevant obstacles can be found in the complementary software. In some sense trade
is not hampered by deficiencies in the transport system, but by trade barriers themselves.
4. An Assessment of the External TEN Policy in Eastern Europe
To assess the relative contribution of the various EU transport initiatives in Eastern European
accession candidates to their national and regional, and to Union-wide economic
development, two different points of departure may be taken: (i) The first relates to the
contribution of active help of infrastructure policy (planning and financing) and of integrating
Eastern transport market into European transport markets to overall and to regional growth in
general. (ii) The second deals with the proper federal (or in the case of the EU: quasi-federal)
layer, to which competencies for these policy actions should be allocated.
Every assessment of the initiatives of international transport policy in the east, however, has
also to take into account some basic features of the Eastern Baltic Sea Region: First one has
to realize that the Baltic Sea ever has been of a connecting rather than of a separating
character for the adjacent countries. It has ever been one of the most busiest parts of the world
oceans (In the late 1980s about 300 m. tonnes were transported on the Baltic sea-lane; this
represented nearly 8 p.c. of total world seaborne cargo, though the Baltic Sea does not make
up for more than 0.15 p.c. of the world oceans’ surface (Böhme 1987: 17; 1988: 383 ff.)).
Thus, transport policy in this region has to pay attention to maritime transport in any case.
Second the Baltic Sea is one of the main transit points to Russia. A substantial part of the
Russian foreign trade is shipped through the Eastern Baltic Sea region, mostly via Baltic
ports.
6 Thus, future development of transport and consequently of action in transport policy
depends on what is happening in Russia.
4.1 The Contribution of Infrastructure Links and of Transport Market Integration to
Spatial Growth
From a very general point of view, the case for an active infrastructure policy in Eastern
Europe may seem straightforward. Keeping in mind the still existing severe rail, road, and
airport network bottlenecks and quality constraints, one may well contend that these
bottlenecks are acting as serious developments impediments, as they impair the ability of the
Eastern accession candidates to integrate their markets into the international division of labour
physically.
7
It is simply the lacking accessibility of these countries which would prevent them from taking
part in the international division of labour if both domestic and border-crossing infrastructure
networks would exhibit serious bottlenecks and would hamper permeability of traffic flows.
The provision of additional transport options increases the likelihood of economic contacts
and thus offers options for engaging in a welfare enhancing interregional division of labour.
8
Moreover, cross country analyses in the sequel of the well-known Aschauer debate (on the10
contribution of public investment in infrastructure facility upgrading and augmenting to
aggregate productivity growth) show that productivity growth triggered off by infrastructure
investment was highest in less developed countries with underdeveloped transport networks.
9
But notwithstanding these general justifications of infrastructure policy in the east, some
caveats are warranted: (i) Even in accessibility models, which seem to be exclusively related
to infrastructure hardware, software improvements, like transport market deregulation, may
serve the same end of enhancing physical accessibility of countries or regions as the
construction of costly additional infrastructure links does. Given the high costs of constructing
infrastructure facilities, the software solutions may be often superior to additional hardware.
In some sense this argument refers to the debate on the relative effectiveness of hard versus
soft locational factors for economic development. (ii) It may be remembered that one (among
a long list) of the objections raised against Aschauer’s findings of high rates of return of
investment in road building was that empirical analyses often did not incorporate software
solutions for a more rational utilization of existing capacities, like road pricing. Thus,
hardware projects which are more visible (and according to considerations of political
economy are more easily to „sell“ to voters) may lie in the center of a political agenda while
creating the complementary software of user cost regimes and of a functioning framework for
transport markets would even be more important but are often opposed by vested interests.
Taking together the general justification of infrastructure policy for the east and the
aforementioned caveats, one may contend that a substantial transport network upgrading
workload, in particular for land-based infrastructure, is still warranted in the countries on the
Eastern Baltic Rim in any case. This assessment will hold for the years to come at least with
respect to land-based networks. However, the productivity of these hardware measures will be
greatly enhanced by additional software development. This includes promoting (a) initiatives
of including user-cost regimes and (b) the adjustment of transport market regimes of the
Eastern applicants to meanwhile more liberal EU standards. Accordingly, the Polish
motorway programme which widely is going to employ BOT schemes may, at least in
principle, account for the need of including pricing schemes, though it can be heavily
criticized because of its current concrete design and of improper legal provisions.
10 Also, the
EU software pre-accession aid for future member states on the Eastern Baltic Rim — in form
of institutional help for opening up transport markets and applying EU safety norms (Boeing
1998: 2)  — will lower transport costs in this region and enhance its accessibility. And
institutional support by the EU may lower the transport cost account of these countries also
indirectly: Their adjustment to the acquis communautaire provides the base for reliable legal
systems and stable institutions (Kinnock 1998: 3), which are a particular prerequisite for
foreign public or private transport infrastructure investments in these countries because of the
sunk cost character and the long depreciation periods of infrastructure hardware.
1111
4.2 Aspects of Fiscal Federalism: Centralized or De-centralized Infrastructure
Planning and Development Aid to EIT?
Given the general case in favour of hardware infrastructure network development in Eastern
Baltic Rim countries, the next question arises as to the competencies for the respective policy
actions. Or to put it another way: Who should do the job? Is designing Pan-European TENs
and Crete Corridors also in Eastern Europe and providing a large part of the necessary
financial means a case for central action — in this case: mostly by the EU in conjunction with
other international institutions —, or should these tasks better be pursued by the individual
states according to the subsidiarity principle? Different answers may be given with respect to
(i) planning and providing such networks, and (ii) financing them.
Concerning the process of designing TENs, planning spatially and intermodally intertwined
networks and providing missing links a lot of good economic arguments can be put forward in
favour of some central competence.
12 Among them is the fact that entirely nationally provided
networks might neglect international links and thus might create various kinds of externalities:
(a) direct ones with respect to missing financial contributions of foreign users, and (b)
network externalities due to the fact that traveling options for each user would rise more than
proportionally if bottlenecks were widened and gaps were closed (Welfens 1996: 154  f.,
162 f.).
However, it is open to doubt whether this central task has to encompass the process of setting
up concrete infrastructure plans, a central involvement in the planning process of transport
corridors or even a realization of such plans by providing specified links or not. Externalities
between national infrastructure networks can also be internalized in bi- or trilateral
negotiations and agreements between the parties concerned in the particular case. A genuine
central task (to be provided by the EU or in a Pan-European setting by the CEMT), however,
would be the design and enforcement of rules and institutions, for conflict settlement purposes
and providing solutions in the case of strategic behaviour of countries. On the base of such an
institutional design, the planning of border-crossing links in networks could be left to the
individual countries, and hence, tax payers’ money would not be wasted by duplicating the
national planning task on the supra-national layer (Laaser 1998a).
This argument is reinforced by the practical way in which intra-EU TENs are planned and
provided. In the first place this refers to the process of co-financing. When projects have to be
accepted for co-financing from the EU budget — this co-financing is seen as incentive to
build these links —, planning has to be done twice: on the national layer as before, and on the
international layer for choosing between different projects under the budget constraint. Thus,
a substantial part of the planning task is done twice anyway. Moreover, the EU TEN priority
lists of new links between current EU member states — which should be newly provided or
whose realization should be speeded up by EU TEN policy — has been compiled simply by12
adding up requests from the single member states. Looking at these lists for the various modes
renders the impression that (a) only such projects were included whose planning process had
already been completed and where no planning costs could be saved, and (b) not all of the
projects show a clear tendency of closing serious gaps between national networks. Instead of
this, these lists seem to have been compiled according to the „me too“-principle.
13
In how far does the assessment change if we turn to pan-European networks? At least
concerning the Eastern Baltic Rim we are looking at, the picture is not very different due to
formal reasons. With the exception — of course — of Russia, the EIT on the Eastern shore of
the Baltic Sea have applied for EU membership, and Estonia and Poland have been considered
worth of being included into the first round of accession negotiations. Latvia and Lithuania
have to wait for a second round, but are included into the pre-accession partnerships and
support programmes as far as transport is concerned. Taking this for granted, there cannot be a
substantial difference between current and future EU member states concerning the
assessment that centrally providing merely the software for co-ordinating infrastructure
bottlenecks beyond borders is superior to a central network planning. Even if we take into
account the information that a substantial part of Western infrastructure support programmes
in the Eastern Baltic Rim countries is used for improving technical and managerial skills and
professionality in road and rail facilities planning and maintenance administration, this does
not constitute a long term factor to discriminate between Western and Eastern transport
network planners. Thus, if institutions and mechanisms to co-ordinate trans-border network
design — between the EU and the applicants and among the applicants — are provided, the
externality argument cannot support central network planning to a greater extent than in the
current EU. Looking at what is actually done in these countries, it seems justified to say that
internalization of network externalities is sufficiently be performed within the Joint
Subcommittees on Transport, TENs and Telecommunications, which have been implemented
according to the Europe agreements with Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in order to
assess the progress of regulatory adjustment.
14 Additional central planning seems
questionable.
Turning to the task of financing the envisaged transport network improvements in the Eastern
Baltic Region we have to ask in how far it is efficient to involve foreign funds. Basically, the
principle of fiscal equivalence (Olson 1969) has to be applied. This principle requires that the
circle of users should be by and large congruent with the circles of payers and of decision-
makers. Otherwise, a waste of scarce resources might occur, because illusions on financial
constraints might emerge, costs could be shifted to external tax payers, and free-rider
problems might result. From this it follows that the applicant countries will have to bear to
bulk of financing by themselves: The bulk of utility will accrue to these countries to be
connected to the economic centers by the external TENs. When they are joining the free trade
regime area by TENs physically, they can internalize the gains from trade and make use of the13
opportunities of catching-up. Apart from this line of reasoning, gains from trade also accrue to
other countries. In this context the high share of transit traffic in the Baltic countries should be
remembered. Thus, both some planning and some financing duties of the international
community representing the widely dispersed other users may be justified, even if we do not
go back to development aid or regional policy arguments on equity grounds.
15 Following this
argument, the international community may not have any choice but providing financial
support to infrastructure upgrading in the EIT even on efficiency grounds.
However, again some caveats are warranted. Co-financing and the formulation of guiding
schemes for international investment —  like  the  Crete  Corridors —  easily  can  lead  to  a
concentration of efforts on inter-regional prestige links, thereby neglecting the complementary
intra-regional links: Mainly these directly complementary networks are worn out in the Baltic
countries and in Poland.
16 It remains a question of efficient regional development policy
whether a concentration of means on main transport axes is superior to a dispersion of efforts,
if the most serious problems can be found just off the trunk routes. In addition, if one takes
into account the empirical result from Western studies that more serious bottlenecks often can
be found for a whole region to connect to an existing node of a main network spoke —
regional development is impaired by the lack of an adequate additional intra-regional
network
17 — than the guiding schemes of Crete Corridors seem to be somewhat misleading.
This potential misallocation is reinforced by the negative incentive effects which is
accompanying any co-financing scheme with constrained choice: If a substantial part of the
financial resources is provided from outside the own coffers, then the own expenditure
decision will be biased in favour of a particular project, even if its marginal return to capital
would not justify the expenditure if full costs had to be borne. Now, if foreign capital
provision (in this case for Crete Corridors) is directed toward projects which do not fit the
development potential of the countries in question this will in addition absorb the scarce
domestic funds which would have a higher marginal product in intra-regional network
upgrading. In the specific case of the Eastern Baltic Rim this danger seems to be a real option
with respect to the regional peculiarities, as the next sections will show.
4.3. Network Design
The first issue is concerned with the actual design of the Crete Corridors itself which proves
to be problematic from a transport geographic perspective. As has already been mentioned,
the bulk of traffic volumes in the three Baltic countries and in the Russian Baltic Rim oblasts
as well as a lower but still substantial share of transport volumes in Poland is incoming or
outgoing Russian transit traffic. The Eastern Baltic Rim is the second important transit point
for Russian foreign trade (second only to the Black Sea ports, cf. Peters 1993: 267). To give
way to Russian (and CIS) bound and originating traffic is and will remain the most important
task for the infrastructure networks of the small countries on the Baltic Rim; transports from14
and to Russia will dominate domestic rail, road and pipeline traffic in Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania; to some extend Russian related transports will also influence capacity utilization of
the Polish overland networks. Thus, east-west corridors are by far more important on the
Eastern Baltic Rim than the respective North-South corridors are.
Current transport networks in the three Baltic countries clearly reflect this traditional role of
the Baltic ports as former CMEA’s window to the West,
18 which cannot be expected to change
drastically, simply due to the relative size of population figures and markets, even if the drags
to the reform process in Russia may hamper Russian economic development potentials for the
foreseeable future. In contrast to this, from the three Crete Corridors that will run through this
region (CC I Helsinki-Tallinn-Riga Kaunas-Warszawa = Via Baltica, with a branch Riga-
Kaliningrad-Gdansk and further to the West = Via Hanseatica; CC II Berlin-Warszawa-
Minsk-Moskva and competing land-bridge; CC IX Helsinki-St. Petersburg-Moskva, with a
branch St.Petersburg-Pskov-Kiew-Odessa, and another one from Kaliningrad and Klaipeda-
Kaunas-Vilnius-Minsk-Kiew
19), only the last one takes into account the main transport lines in
this region. Thus, if foreign support for transport infrastructure construction in this region
follows the guidelines which are laid down in the actual corridor concept, and if this should
direct also domestic spending, too, then one can conceive that the corridor concept might lead
to a non-negligible waste of resources.
20
But also CC IX does not take into account the other Baltic ports’ role as transit point for
transports from and to Moscow and the Russian mainland. At least, one may interpret the
corridor design as the attempt of picking in advance the winner in the process of port
competition on the Eastern Baltic Rim. This might be another source of waste given the fact
that Russia is trying to initiate to construct several entirely new huge port projects in the
Finnish bay near St. Petersburg probably costing at least several hundreds millions of US-
Dollars, in order to get rid of its perceived dependence on the Baltic countries ports and hard
currency transit transactions (Bolz and Polkowski 1993: 53 ff.). The expected waste of such
projects may come clear from the fact that Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian ports had been
constructed or substantially upgraded during the Soviet era for the very end of serving the
Soviet Unions trade requirements, with decisions being based on these ports locational and
climatic (ice-free) conditions which are favourable in relation to Russian ports. A de-
politicization, probably privatization of decision making, the application of commercial
attitudes and of hard budget constraints  — all being software aspects of infrastructure
provision — would be called for (Böhme et al 1998a: 129).
In sum, current and expected future trade flows suggest that east-west corridors should have
the highest priority. In contrast, the actual design of infrastructure facility planning which
seems to follow centrally provided guidelines is in a real danger of ignoring the respective
facts. There might be a systematic bias due to political economic reasons: More visible15
prestige projects may call more attention and support from voters and from the press than do
small scale network improvements, and merely politically inspired decisions tend to ignore
economic costs. One should keep in mind the above mentioned point of a potential misfit
between the return on investment of these prestige projects (interregional networks) and the
need of rebuilding rail and road also at a lower level, where interregional spokes have to be
linked with intra-regional networks. From this perspective, the concentration of efforts on
large-scale road projects like the Via Baltica and the Via Hanseatica seems questionable.
4.4. Aspects of Intermodal Competition and Modal Split
Modal split considerations are important for Russian bound and originating traffic flows
which dominate Eastern Baltic Rim transport. The effect is two-fold: (a) concerning land-
based hinterland traffic, and (b) concerning competition between rail and road on the one hand
and the Baltic Sea lane on the other.
If one assesses the determinants of modal split in Baltic Rim hinterland-traffic to and from
Russia, it becomes quite clear that rail transport will play a much larger role than road
transport, and that rail transport will retain a much larger share in modal split than it actually
has in Western European countries. The reason for this rather uncommon hypothesis does not
lie in the mere fact that road networks seem to have been neglected during Soviet times and
are in a even worse state than rail networks so that a Western style modal shift would take
place immediately if only funds would be directed to road building. Neither are former
ideologically founded regulations in favour of rail transport — which might have created path
dependencies — entirely responsible for this modal split. In contrast, the reasons for the rail
dominance are (a) the pattern of the location of economic activities with very long distances
with bundled traffic flows dominating over short-distance dispersed flows, (b) conditions of
climate and geography making road building much more expensive in most parts of Russia
than in Western Europe (see Böhme et al. 1998a: 129 ff.). The arctic climate in this region
requires much more funds per km of a more or less agreeable road (see e.g. Buchhofer 1993),
and in many  European as well as Asian parts of Russia there is simply a lack of appropriate
building materials like stone and gravel for ballast purposes which have to be supplied from
far away by substantial transport costs.
21 Thus, there is strong evidence that rail transport will
retain its dominance in Russian transport as well as in the respective transit flows.
It is not surprising therefore that the World Bank study on Russian transport arrives at the
conclusion that ”for all practical purposes, surface transport, excluding pipelines, in Russia is
rail, and will remain so for the foreseeable future despite an expected shift to road transport”
(Holt 1993: 64), with a similar position being held by the study of R. North (1996). Hence,
one has to conclude that any attempt to design Eastern Baltic Rim networks according to
Western models would be extremely costly both for the countries concerned and for the
international community which is co-financing.
22 Given the important path dependencies to16
transport network development which are caused by the high share of sunk costs in total costs
of infrastructure construction, a more careful analysis of potential costs and benefits as well as
a hard budget constraint also for development aid is warranted.
The second intermodal aspect refers to the competitive situation between constructing land-
based links and the Baltic sea-lane. Keeping in mind (i) the dominance of traffic flows from
and to Russia in the Eastern Baltic Sea Region, (ii) the relative importance of east-west
corridors, and (iii) the more than proportional costs of constructing land-based infrastructures
in this whole region, one wonders why there is not given sufficient priority to investments
which are complementary to the Baltic sea-lane. Instead, Crete Corridor I relies on the
building of motorways which will run parallel to the Baltic coast-line, like the Via Hanseatica,
and (to a lesser extent) the Via Baltica. From an economic perspective one can hardly
understand why scarce funds are to be used for doubling up already existing infrastructures,
given the fact that the sea-lane provides transport options without user-charges for this
„liquefied motorway“ (except port dues) and that sea transport especially on the Baltic Sea
lane is rather fast though total transport distances including hinterland-links are quite long. the
same reasoning can be applied to traffic from and to Finland to and from Western Europe: It is
hardly any transport relation conceivable, which could not be served by maritime transport in
this region at lower costs.
Moreover, in Crete Corridor II from Berlin to Warszawa and Mockva, one third of the
projected 2.7 BECU are reserved for road improvement (Commission DG VII 1997: 5 f.).
Although currently the bulk of means for road improvement may be devoted to projects in
Poland (where road building can be justified by the high population densities and the scattered
spatial structure of economic activity), the Corridor concept may well give rise to plans to
rebuild the traffic axis from Central to Eastern Europe according to Western models as high
capacity road. Whether this would be justified on economic grounds, may be highly
questionable. In addition, one should not only take into account the probably huge
construction costs, but also the path dependencies, which might be created be large-scale road
building. In the case of Eastern Europe when networks still have to be constructed, we are still
at a point, where we are free to choose without the impasse effects of sunk costs.
Furthermore, let me address the related issue of consistency of EU transport policy. In the
core countries of the Union the EU is pursuing a „road to sea-policy“ based on (i) rapidly
increasing congestion in land-based networks and (ii) the aim of creating a framework for
sustainable transport. It is part of this policy to redirect transport flows from land-based
networks to coastal shipping. Turning to the east, it does not look very consistent to
concentrate infrastructure investment to modes and corridors which are likely to divert traffic
from the Baltic Sea lane in the future. In a way, here is a danger of a „sea to road-policy“.17
5. Conclusions
Combining the assessment of transport markets’ and networks’ deficiencies in the Baltic Rim
EIT and the theoretical considerations on the various policy approaches renders the
impression that the international community, including the EU, should provide support to the
EIT, but that with respect to the undeniable necessary hardware measures some reservations
have to be made, at least in their actual design. Moreover, compared with these hardware
measures the software initiatives of (i) opening up transport markets according to the „Agenda
2000“ scheme, (ii) creating stable institutions for well functioning transport markets and for
competitive transport firms in the EIT, and (iii) improving the productivity and professionality
of network planning and maintenance and of transport related administrations in the EIT seem
even more important than the remaining hardware deficiencies.
The hardware component of providing qualified transport networks of course can be
consistently seen as an indispensable prerequisite for deepening the spatial division of labour.
This is what is behind the notion of infrastructure bottlenecks that hamper economic
development. These negative effects, though, will be multiplied by inefficient institutions. It
is the purpose of institutions to lower transaction costs in economic interaction between
individuals, firms, organizations, public bodies, and states. Institutions are to provide clarity,
transparency, reliability, foreseeability and stability in rule-and decision-making. If
institutions fail to render these functions, economic interaction cannot function properly and
may even be blocked so that hold-up situations can emerge. Such hold-ups are characterized
by prohibitively high transaction costs and can make up for the most relevant obstacles to
interaction, trade, and, consequently, transport. Hence, relatively poor countries will suffer
from transport policy shortcomings (like delayed privatization of, say, port handling agencies,
inefficient regimes of user charges) even more than do rich countries. Getting the software,
i.e. the institutions, right, is, from this perspective, all the more important for the EIT because
it takes such a long time to get rid of hardware bottlenecks.
Looking at the institutional design in the specific case of TENs and their extension to the east,
the Crete Corridors, one well extend the reservations against intra-EU TENs to external TEN
policy. Subsidiarity is called for even in infrastructure network design, where border-crossing
externalities have to be taken into account. For regional development, the connection to
interregional and global axes at certain nodes and the upgrading of the complementary
network which provides this access may be more important. The problem of ignoring local
problems in central plans — one of the grounds of the subsidarity principle — may also come
true for TENs, and it is reinforced by means of co-financing, which guides local fund
allocation.
Some characteristics of transport in the Eastern Baltic Region illustrate the background of
these reservations: The dominance of Russian transit traffic favours east-west axes, but18
network plans are drawn which seem to be guided by equal geographical distribution
considerations. Russian transit traffic also favours the railways in hinterland traffic, but it look
like Western models of network design with road dominance — which may be justified under
specific Western locational conditions — are transferred to the east. And it is the free of
charge competition of the Baltic sea-lane, which withdraws most of the economic and social
return of ambitious motorway projects, but which does not seem to be taken into account
sufficiently in decision making. This may give rise to the impression that subsidiarity is not
accounted for sufficiently, and too low a weight is given to complementary software aspects
of transport policy including network provision.
                                                
1 This paper draws in large parts on a joint report on obstacles to transport in the Eastern Baltic Sea Region ,
which has been recently prepared in the Kiel Institute of World Economics (see Böhme et al. 1998a; 1998b).
2 The Treaty of Maastricht in its Art. 129b-d empowers the Union — as supra-national and quasi-federal layer —
to take actions towards forming and completing TENs in transport, telecommunications, and energy.
 According to
the Maastricht Treaty this task is to be fulfilled by (i) providing connections of the national networks of the
member states, (ii) easing the access to these networks, both for service providers and end-users of these services,
(iii) guaranteeing the (technical) interoperability of the networks, and (iv) helping to enhance the connections of
peripheral and insular regions of the Union with the economic centers and core regions.
3 Cf. Kinnock (1998); Boeing (1998). This estimate has replaced an older one which was provided in the first
report of the TINA group and which assessed the overall cost lying between 65 and 95 billion ECU of which 31
billion ECU would have to be incurred for the Crete Corridors. See EBRD (1997a: 20).
4 This is not true for the other international financial institutions WB and EIB. They are giving support on a
projects base.
5 In 1990 about 30 p.c. of seaborne Russian foreign trade of around 180 m. tonnes was handled by ports on the
Eastern shore of the Baltic Sea (Peters 1993: 267).
6 The exact share of total Russian foreign trade (including land transports) which is being shipped via Baltic ports,
cannot be ascertained, but the high dependency of these ports on Russian transit may be demonstrated by the fact
that the share of transit traffic in the Baltic countries ranges from 60-65 p.c. in Estonia to 85-90 p.c. in Latvia,
with Lithuania lying in-between this range (cf. Hayter 1993: 296; Rutz and Laving 1997: 499; Laving 1998;
Hoffmann 1998: 27 ff.).
7In order to arrive at this conclusion, one does not have to go back to classical writers who compared
infrastructure deficiencies, like deep potholes amidst a road, with high tariff barriers. Such a notion can be found,
for example, in the work of the 19th century French advocate of free trade, Bastiat (1880). Nor one has to rely on
often unprecise and biased questionnaires among enterprises willing to relocate to pertinent regions when they are
asked for a ranking of important locational factors. See, e.g. Hoffmeyer et al. (1990: 96 ff.), Busch and Klös
(1995: 9 ff.) or Junesch (1996: 36 ff) for a synopsis of such surveys.
8 For a recent assessment of accessibility models see Martellato and Nijkamp (1996).
9 A comprehensive survey on the course and the results of the Aschauer debate can be found in Pfähler et al.
(1995) and Pfähler et al. (1996).
10 Concerning planning deficiencies cf. in detail ”Experten üben Kritik an Polens Autobahn-Plänen”,
Handelsblatt, Düsseldorf, of 5 March 1997. Moreover, according to European Investment Bank, the current legal
framework does not account for the well-known institutional incentive problems of Public-Private Partnerships in
infrastructure provision so that construction cost may well be above those which would have to be incurred for a
programme entirely being performed in the public sector.
11 Stable institutions seem to be even more important for private transport investment than for
telecommunications investment (Laaser 1998b).19
                                                                                                                                                        
12 Cf. e.g. Vickerman (1995) or Welfens (1996).
13 For a comprehensive description and critical assessment of intra-EU TEN policy see Sichelschmidt (1997).
14 See Boeing (1998: 4) for the mostly regulatory tasks of these committees.
15 Cf. for a similar argument Welfens (1996: 163 f.).
16 Cf. Böhme et al. (1998: 91 f.).
17 See e.g. Vickerman (1995: 248) who puts forward this argument and refers to pertinent studies for Western
Europe. Similar and even more pronounced phenomena can be found in less developed countries where the
central port or airport of the agglomeration of the capital may be well connected to international shipping and air-
transport while adequate transport networks do not go beyond the capital’s border and leave the rest of the
country to the jungle.
18 See EBRD (1996: 45) and Buchhofer (1993: 127) for background information.
19 See Commission DG VII (1997).
20 To be sure: The projected costs of CC I Via Baltica/Via Hanseatica with 700 MECU (rail and road) look small
compared to 2700 MECU for the land-bridge CC II and 4000 MECU for CC IX (Commission DG VII 1997), but
are high enough anyway. In addition, also the land-bridge CC II may receive too much attention compared with
the cost-less Baltic Sea lane as will be argued below.
21 Cf. Böhme et al. (1998: 130) referring to Raupach (1968) and a former study from the Kiel Institute and the
Hamburg Institute (Foders et al. 1991).
22 In the end, we arrive at the ambiguous outcome that in the current European Union one may well criticize a
particular rail-bias in the internal TEN concepts, which is due to the Commissions policy of modal shift towards
rail freight transport and High-Speed Rail Passenger systems in Western Europe, not the least on concepts of
sustained mobility (Sichelschmidt 1997), while in Eastern Europe the same institutions are doing quite the
opposite.20
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Table 1 – Seaborne cargo turnover of all sea-ports in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and
the Russian Baltic rim oblasts 1980–1996
of which ports in
Total Russia
a
Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland
Millions of metric tonnes
1980 . . . 36.8 12.2 61.5
1985 . . . 39.6 15.6 50.1
1988 135 10.9 9.0 42.6 20.7 51.8
1989 . . . 44.2 21.1 48.0
1990 119 10.8 8.3 37.2 16.1 47.0
1991 . . . 30.3 15.7 41.8
1992 110 15.0 10.7 27.4 12.9 44.3
1993 120 13.8 12.5 27.4 15.8 50.5
1994 130 16.5 11.7 35.1 14.5 52.4
1995 135 21.4 13.0 39.0 12.7 49.2
1996 144 21.1 14.1 44.5 14.8 48.9
Shares in total turnover of port range (pct.)
1988 100 8 7 32 15 38
1990 100 9 7 31 14 39
1992 100 14 10 25 12 40
1993 100 12 9 23 13 42
1994 100 13 9 27 11 40
1995 100 16 10 29 9 36
1996 100 15 10 31 10 34
Index numbers 1988 = 100
1990 88 99 92 87 77 91
1992 81 138 119 64 62 86
1993 89 127 139 64 76 97
1994 96 151 130 82 70 101
1995 100 196 144 92 61 95
1996 107 194 157 106 71 94
a
Baltic ports (St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad).
Source: Böhme et al. (1998a: 150).23
Table 2 – Rail Networks in Baltic Rim Countries 1994
Country Network Length Network Density
with Respect to












a 132 12.9 108 10.6 23 0.673
Latvia 2 413 271 11.2 304 12.6 37 0.951
Lithuania 2 002 122 6.1 560 28.0 31 0.542






Western Market Economies on the Baltic Rim
Denmark 2 349 370 15.8 897 38.2 55 0.447
Finland 5 880 1 950 33.2 496 8.4 17 1.149
Germany 41 401 17 748 42.9 17 239 41.6 116 0.506
Norway 4 023 2 422 60.2 111 2.8 12 0.924
Sweden 9 661 7 182 74.3 1 338 13.8 24 1.093
a
According to EVR (1996): 1 127 km. – 
b
11.8 p.c. of Russian railways.
Source: Böhme et al. (1998a: 148).24

























Estonia 14 992 65 0.4 1 127 7.5 54.0 332 9.9
Latvia
b.c 20 402 - - 7 024 34.4 38.3 316 8.0
Lithuania
b.c 21 121 394 1.9 4 479 21.2 51.0 324 5.7
Poland 372 479 257 0.07 45 420 12.2 65.3 1 152 9.7
Russia
c 453 000 2 600 0.6 38 700 8.5 51.0 27 3.1
Western Market Economies on the Baltic Rim
Denmark 71 420 830 1.2 3 730 5.2 100.0 1 657 13.6
Finland 77 723 394 0.5 12 366 15.9 63.0 280 15.2
Germany 650 700 11 200 1.7 41 700 6.4 99.0 1 823 8.0
Norway 90 261 105 0.1 26 452 29.3 73.5 278 20.7
Sweden 136 233 1 231 0.9 14 645 10.8 76.0 332 15.4
a
Public networks only. – 
b
Corrected for obviously misspecified data for paved roads because of the inclusion of
gravel roads. – 
c
Agricultural and industrial roads which are included in IRF data base omitted; figures are for
Latvia: 39 644 km. Lithuania 40 321 km. Russia 416 000 km.
Source: Böhme et al. (1998a: 149).